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TERN · CIK 1831363

What Terns Pharmaceuticals, Inc. told the SEC could break it.

2 self-disclosed vulnerabilities, pulled from its own filings — each in the company’s words, with the source. This is the risk register almost nobody reads.

A limited set so far — we surface every cited disclosure we’ve extracted for TERN. More may follow as additional filings are processed.

In its own words

What could break it.

Other disclosures

  • Complete reliance on third-party contract manufacturers for all drug candidates; no long-term agreementsmedium

    Terns owns no manufacturing facilities and has no plans to build any; it relies completely on third-party contract manufacturers to produce all of its drug candidates for preclinical research and clinical trials (and intends to for any commercial supply). It does not have long-term agreements with these third parties, leaving its drug supply exposed to CMO capacity, quality, pricing and continuity risk that could stop, delay or raise the cost of its programs.

    We do not own or operate manufacturing facilities for the production of any of our drug candidates, nor do we have plans to develop our own manufacturing operations in the foreseeable future. We currently rely, and expect to continue to rely, on third-party contract manufacturers to manufacture all our drug candidates for preclinical research and clinical trials. We do not have long-term agreements with any of these third parties.

    SEC filing →As of 2026

Regulatory & policy

  • China CDMO dependence (WuXi) exposed to BIOSECURE-style restrictions + threatened 100%+ pharma import tariffslow

    Terns imports product candidates and materials from China under manufacturing service arrangements with WuXi, concentrating its drug supply in a Chinese CDMO at a time of escalating US-China biopharma tensions. Its exposure runs through two distinct policy mechanisms: (1) legislation (BIOSECURE-style) that may restrict US companies' engagement with Chinese firms providing biopharma R&D and manufacturing services such as WuXi, and (2) threatened tariffs of 100% or more on branded/patented drugs imported into the US by manufacturers that do not build domestically. Either could force a costly, time-consuming manufacturing transfer or raise input costs.

    The U.S. government has recently made statements and taken actions that could lead to changes to U.S. and international trade policies, including imposing several rounds of tariffs and trade restrictions affecting certain products manufactured in China, and enacting legislation that, may restrict certain engagement with certain Chinese companies that provide biopharmaceutical research, development, and manufacturing services.

The hidden graph

Who it depends on, and who depends on it.

Relationships surfaced from filings — including ones disclosed by the other side, which is how the non-obvious ones come to light.

Its customers

  • Hansoh Pharmaceutical Group

    We may generate revenue from pre-specified clinical, regulatory and sales milestones as part of an exclusive option and license agreement for TERN-701 in greater China with Hansoh.

    Cited →

Its suppliers

  • WuXi

    any product candidates and materials that we import from China, including pursuant to our manufacturing service arrangements with WuXi.

    Cited →

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