Karimi v

Crowley, 172 Ga. App. 761, 324 S.E.2d 583 (1984). Agreement to accept exclusive remedy of workers’ compensation. — The decedent who acted as an independent 34-9-11 contractor in relationship to an employer was entitled to coverage under the workers’ compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) by an agreement whereby the employer accepted deductions from the contractor’s pay and applied them to the employer’s workers’ compensation insurance policy in order for the contractor to obtain coverage under the employer’s policy. Lott v. Ace Post Co., 175 Ga. App. 196, 332 S.E.2d 676 (1985). The decedent/independent contractor who agreed with the employer to be covered by the workers’ compensation law, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., was limited to exclusive coverage under this law and could not (by the decedent’s survivors) claim a lack of reciprocal estoppel, as the employer’s quid pro quo was its surrender under the agreement of any defense of a lack of negligence in regard to a compensable injury to the decedent. Lott v. Ace Post Co., 175 Ga. App. 196, 332 S.E.2d 676 (1985). No exception for violating safety standards. — O.C.G.A. § 46-3-30 et seq., imposing certain safety standards, not only upon employers of workers performing certain acts in proximity to hazardous high-voltage lines, is not an exception to the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq. Pappas v. Hill-Staton Eng’rs, Inc., 183 Ga. App. 258, 358 S.E.2d 625, cert. denied, 183 Ga. App. 906, 358 S.E.2d 625 (1987); City of Dalton v. Gene Rogers Constr. Co., 223 Ga. App. 819, 479 S.E.2d 171 (1996); Flint Elec. Membership Corp. v. Ed Smith Constr. Co., 229 Ga. App. 838, 495 S.E.2d 136 (1998). No separate action for concealed work hazards. — Employee could not bring a separate action against an employer independent of the exclusivity provisions of the workers’ compensation law, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., on the ground that the employer concealed work place hazards in violation of O.C.G.A. § 34-7-20, since this law makes no statutory exception to the exclusive remedy provisions. Dugger v. Miller Brewing Co., 199 Ga. App. 850, 406 S.E.2d 484 (1991), cert. denied, 199 Ga. App. 905, 406 S.E.2d 484 (1991). Restricted application of equitable estoppel. — The successful continuation 515 Remedies (Cont’d) of the workers’ compensation system requires that studied caution be exercised before the doctrine of estoppel is applied against an injured party bringing a personal injury action who does nothing more than receive compensation benefits voluntarily provided by an employer. Collins v. Grafton, Inc., 263 Ga. 441, 435 S.E.2d 37 (1993). Pleadings and Practice Exclusive jurisdiction of board. — When the injuries which a plaintiff sustains are clearly the result of an ‘‘accident’’ within the terms of the workers’ compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), the plaintiff ’s remedy against an employer is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the state board of workers’ compensation and not in the superior court. Echols v. Chattooga Mercantile Co., 74 Ga. App. 18, 38 S.E.2d 675 (1946). Proof of coverage required to bar negligence action. — Defendant may assert coverage under the workers’ compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) as a bar to a common-law negligence action against the defendant arising out of the same occurrence, whether or not a claim for compensation has been made, but in order to sustain such assertion one 34-9-11 must plead and prove coverage; an award of compensation would be an adjudication of coverage and consequently a bar to a common-law action, but an award of no compensation because of no coverage would be an adjudication of no coverage and a common-law action could proceed. Bishop v. Weems, 118 Ga. App. 180, 162 S.E.2d 879 (1968). When immunity defense to be raised. — O.C.G.A. § 9-11-8(c) does not require that the statutory employer’s defense under O.C.G.A. §§ 34-9-8 and 34-9-11 be affirmatively raised in the defendant’s answer. Wright Assocs. v. Rieder, 247 Ga. 496, 277 S.E.2d 41 (1981). Conflict of laws. — For a case dealing with one jurisdiction’s ability to make a supplemental workers’ compensation award subsequent to an award by another jurisdiction, despite the fact that the latter has an exclusivity of remedies provision, see Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 100 S. Ct. 2647, 65 L. Ed. 2d 757 (1980). Claim of statutory immunity. — Claim of statutory immunity under Georgia’s workers’ compensation scheme is an affirmative defense and subject to waiver under Rule 8(c), Fed. R. Civ. P., in federal diversity of citizenship actions. Troxler v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 717 F.2d 530 (11th Cir. 1983).