A mere owner to whom the contractual obligation of performance is owed and from whom no contractual obligation of performance is due is not a ‘‘principal contractor’’ under that section

Yoho v. Ringier of Am., Inc., 263 Ga. 338, 434 S.E.2d 57 (1993). In a personal injury action brought against a public utility by an independent contractor’s employee who was injured while doing work at the utility during a shutdown, the genuine issue of material fact as to whether the utility was acting as a contractor at the time the employee was injured precluded summary judgment on the grounds the utility was the employee’s statutory employer. Guillman v. Georgia Power Co., 211 Ga. App. 690, 440 S.E.2d 83 (1994). Coverage. — Since secondary liability imposed under this section was predicated upon the existence of a principal contractor-subcontractor relationship, that section was not intended to cover all employers who let out work on contract, but was limited to those who contract to perform certain work, such as the furnishing of goods and services, for another, and then sublet in whole or in part such work. Evans v. Hawkins, 114 Ga. App. 120, 150 S.E.2d 324 (1966); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Fuller, 123 Ga. App. 585, 181 S.E.2d 876 (1971). Employer may not bypass workers’ compensation laws simply by designating certain employees as independent contractors. Amtrust N. Am., Inc. v. Smith, 315 Ga. App. 133, 726 S.E.2d 628 (2012). Other rights excluded. — Rights and remedies granted under the workers’ compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) to an employee exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee, the employee’s personal representative, parents, dependents, or next-of-kin, or otherwise, on account of injury, loss of service, or death, other than the employee’s right to bring an action against a third-party tort-feasor. Haygood v. Home Transp. Co., 149 Ga. App. 229, 253 S.E.2d 805, aff ’d, 244 Ga. 165, 259 S.E.2d 429 (1979). Applicability to owners. — O.C.G.A. § 34-9-8 applies to contractors and not owners, unless the owner also serves as a contractor. Modlin v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 170 Ga. App. 477, 317 S.E.2d 255 (1984); Rickets v. Tri-State Sys., 177 Ga. App. 509, 339 S.E.2d 732 (1986). Owners or entities merely in possession or control of the premises would not be subject to workers’ compensation liability as statutory employers, except in the isolated situation when that party also serves as a contractor for yet another entity and hires another contractor to perform the work on the premises. R.E. Thomas Erectors, Inc. v. Brunswick Pulp & Paper Co., 171 Ga. App. 903, 321 S.E.2d 412 (1984). Law does not grant tort immunity to owners, who are not contractors, even though they are in control of premises and are actively involved in the enterprise in which an employee was injured. Dye v. Trussway, Inc., 211 Ga. App. 139, 438 S.E.2d 194 (1993). ‘‘Premises’’ construed. — Word ‘‘premises’’ as used in O.C.G.A. § 34-9-8 does not include the premises of a shipper’s customer to which goods are delivered. Gramling v. Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., 162 Ga. App. 863, 292 S.E.2d 539 (1982). Premises where section applicable. — O.C.G.A. § 34-9-8 is applicable only when an injury occurred on, in, or about the premises on which the principal contractor has undertaken to execute work, or which are otherwise under the principal’s control or management. Wright Assocs. v. Rieder, 247 Ga. 496, 277 S.E.2d 41 (1981). Insurer entitled to recover premiums due under workers’ compensation insurance policy. — Trial court did not err in granting an insurer summary judgment in the insurer’s action to recover premiums due under a workers’ compensation insurance policy the insurer issued to an insured because the insurer submitted evidence on the number of workers on the insured’s payroll, the amount of the payroll, the classifications of those workers, and the applicable rates; the insured did not come forward with any evidence to show that any of the workers listed were covered by other workers’ compensation insurance, and therefore, did not show that any of the workers had been ‘‘misclassified’’ by the audit. Dennis Perry Homes, Inc. v. Companion Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 311 Ga. App. 706, 716 S.E.2d 798 (2011). Cited in United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Corbett, 31 Ga. App. 7, 119 S.E. 921 (1923); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Palmer, 33 Ga. App. 522, 126 S.E. 862 (1925); Davis v. Menefee, 34 Ga. App. 813, 131 S.E. 527 (1926); Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Council, 35 Ga. App. 632, 134 S.E. 331 (1926); Zurich Gen. Accident & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Lee, 36 Ga. App. 248, 136 S.E. 173 (1926); Irving v. Home Accident Ins. Co., 36 Ga. App. 551, 137 S.E. 105 (1927); Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Wilson, 36 Ga. App. 784, 138 S.E. 246 (1927); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Radney, 37 Ga. App. 286, 139 S.E. 832 (1927); Employers Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Treadwell, 37 Ga. App. 759, 142 S.E. 182 (1928); Cooper v. Dixie Constr. Co., 45 Ga. App. 420, 165 S.E. 152 (1932); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ragan, 191 Ga. 811, 14 S.E.2d 88 (1941); Blackshear v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 69 Ga. App. 790, 26 S.E.2d 793 (1943); Blair v. Smith, 201 Ga. 747, 41 S.E.2d 133 (1947); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fricks, 81 Ga. App. 727, 59 S.E.2d 671 (1950); Employer’s Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Smith, 86 Ga. App. 230, 71 S.E.2d 289 (1952); Smith v. Maryland Cas. Co., 93 Ga. App. 222, 91 S.E.2d 188 (1956); Chevrolet Div., GMC v. Dempsey, 212 Ga. 560, 93 S.E.2d 703 (1956); Hale v. Kendrick, 95 Ga. App. 348, 98 S.E.2d 65 (1957); Mosley v. George A. Fuller Co., 250 F.2d 686 (5th Cir. 1957); Benefield v. McDonough Constr. Co., 106 Ga. App. 194, 126 S.E.2d 704 (1962); Corbitt v. McClurd, 107 Ga. App. 113, 129 S.E.2d 389 (1962); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Rozier, 117 Ga. App. 178, 160 S.E.2d 236 (1968); Bli Constr. Co. v. Knowles, 123 Ga. App. 588, 181 S.E.2d 879 (1971); Lyons v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 127 Ga. App. 268, 193 S.E.2d 244 (1972); Simpkins v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 130 Ga. App. 535, 203 S.E.2d 742 (1974); Greyhound Van Lines v. Collins, 132 Ga. App. 806, 209 S.E.2d 250 (1974); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 146 Ga. App. 68, 245 S.E.2d 322 (1978); Arthur Pew Constr. Co. v. Bryan Constr. Co., 148 Ga. App. 114, 251 S.E.2d 105 (1978); Goolsby v. Wilson, 150 Ga. App. 611, 258 S.E.2d 216 (1979); Haygood v. Home Transp. Co., 244 Ga. 165, 259 S.E.2d 429 (1979); Farmer v. Ryder Truck Lines, 245 Ga. 734, 266 S.E.2d 922 (1980); Mimms v. Sisk Decorating Co., 156 Ga. App. 572, 275 S.E.2d 148 (1980); Cleckley v. Batson-Cook Co., 160 Ga. App. 831, 288 S.E.2d 573 (1982); Long v. Marvin M. Black Co., 163 Ga. App. 633, 294 S.E.2d 641 (1982); Long v. Marvin M. Black Co., 250 Ga. 621, 300 S.E.2d 150 (1983); Manning v. Georgia Power Co., 252 Ga. 404, 314 S.E.2d 432 (1984); Seckinger & Co. v. Foreman, 252 Ga. 540, 314 S.E.2d 891 (1984); Howell v. Parker, 171 Ga. App. 101, 318 S.E.2d 811 (1984); Massey v. United States, 733 F.2d 760 (11th Cir. 1984); McCorkle v. United States, 737 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984); International Indem. Co. v. White, 174 Ga. App. 773, 331 S.E.2d 37 (1985); Gunn v. Sims Crane Serv., Inc., 182 Ga. App. 24, 354 S.E.2d 653 (1987); Carver v. Jasper Constr. Co., 183 Ga. App. 485, 359 S.E.2d 183 (1987); Capitol Fish Co. v. Tanner, 192 Ga. App. 251, 384 S.E.2d 394 (1989); Brown v. Advantage Eng’g, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 1163 (N.D. Ga. 1990); Murph v. Maynard Fixturecraft, Inc., 252 Ga. App. 483, 555 S.E.2d 845 (2001); C. Brown Trucking, Inc. v. Rushing, 265 Ga. App. 676, 595 S.E.2d 346 (2004). Liability 1. In General Liability of principal contractor. — In order to recover under this section, it Liability (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d) was not necessary that the principal contractor have control, or right of control, of the time, manner, and method of performance of either the immediate employer or the claimant. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Fuller, 123 Ga. App. 585, 181 S.E.2d 876 (1971). Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 34-9-8 (a), a general contractor is liable for payment of workers’ compensation benefits to the employee of a subcontractor to the same extent as the subcontractor. Franks v. Avila, 200 Ga. App. 733, 409 S.E.2d 564 (1991). Liability when immediate employer unable to pay award. — When the immediate employer was insolvent and unable to pay an award, and a return of nulla bona was entered to fi. fa. which was issued against such employer, the claimant receiving no sums to which the claimant was entitled, the intermediate contractor was liable for injuries sustained by the claimant while working on work which had been subcontracted to the immediate employer. Churchwell Bros. Constr. Co. v. Archie R. Briggs Constr. Co., 89 Ga. App. 550, 80 S.E.2d 212 (1954), for comment, see 16 Ga. B. J. 465 (1954). Liability of property owner. — Manufacturer which had a contract with an employer to repair and replace tires on the manufacturer’s equipment was merely the ‘‘owner’’ of the property and was not the ‘‘statutory employer’’ of the employee dispatched to the manufacturer’s plant to change a flat tire, who was injured when the new tire exploded, and, therefore, did not have immunity from tort liability. McCrimmons v. Cornell-Young Co., 171 Ga. App. 561, 320 S.E.2d 398 (1984). Liability of general liability insurer. — Injured employee of a subcontractor could not recover a Workers’ Compensation Board award against the general liability insurance policy of a general contractor (neither contractor having obtained workers’ compensation insurance) when the policy excluded ‘‘any obligation which the insured . . . may be held liable under any workers’ compensation . . . law’’. Williams v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 164 Ga. App. 435, 297 S.E.2d 345 (1982). Subrogation rights under uninsured motorist coverage. — Payments made to an insured under uninsured motorist coverage of a liability insurance policy are not payments by one liable to pay damages to the injured party on account of the occurrence causing the injury, and thus do not come within the provision of this section giving an employer or its compensation carrier subrogation rights against one liable to pay damages on account of the injury or death of the employee. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Board of Regents, 266 Ga. 310, 174 S.E.2d 920 (1970). Liability of special employer. — Irrespective of this section, a special, as opposed to a general, employer would be liable to a workers’ compensation claimant without the claimant being required to first institute a claim against the general employer. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co. v. Alexander, 84 Ga. App. 207, 65 S.E.2d 694 (1951). Employer who expressly exempted oneself from coverage under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-2.2 was barred from making a claim against the employer’s own company and the employer could not claim under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-8 (a) to be an employee injured while employed by the company in its capacity as a subcontractor. Greg Fisher, Ltd. v. Samples, 238 Ga. App. 825, 520 S.E.2d 280 (1999). 2. Tort Liability Principal contractor entitled to tort immunity. — Employee of a subcontractor may not collect workers’ compensation from a general contractor under this section, and then sue the general contractor in tort based on the same injury for which workers’ compensation payments were received. Clements v. Georgia Power Co., 148 Ga. App. 745, 252 S.E.2d 635 (1979). Collection of compensation from a statutory employer bars recovery against any others, including the ‘‘principal’’. Haygood v. Home Transp. Co., 149 Ga. App. 229, 253 S.E.2d 805, aff ’d, 244 Ga. 165, 259 S.E.2d 429 (1979). As a statutory employer liable to pay workers’ compensation benefits under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-8, a principal contractor should receive the correlative benefit of tort immunity. Wright Assocs. v. Rieder, 247 Ga. 496, 277 S.E.2d 41 (1981). Employee of an independent subcontractor may not recover in tort against the principal contractor. Wright Assocs. v. Rieder, 247 Ga. 496, 277 S.E.2d 41 (1981). Under O.C.G.A. §§ 34-9-8 and 34-9-11, a statutory employer is immune to any action in negligence by an employee of a subcontractor or an independent contractor who has already paid the employee workers’ compensation benefits. Hensel Phelps Constr. Co. v. Johnson, 161 Ga. App. 631, 295 S.E.2d 843, rev’d on other grounds, 250 Ga. 83, 295 S.E.2d 841 (1982). When an employee of a subcontractor who fell from a ladder at the employee’s place of work recovers workers’ compensation benefits from the employee’s immediate employer, the subcontractor, the prime contractor as a statutory employer is not liable to pay workers’ compensation benefits under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-8 and the prime contractor should receive the correlated benefit of tort immunity under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11. Kitchens v. Winter Co. Bldrs., 161 Ga. App. 701, 289 S.E.2d 807 (1982). Widow of the employee of a subcontractor could not bring a wrongful death action against the general contractor that was liable to pay workers’ compensation benefits as the statutory employer. Warden v. Hoar Constr. Co., 269 Ga. 715, 507 S.E.2d 428 (1998). Injured worker could not sue a statutory employer in tort after that employer successfully defeated a claim for workers’ compensation benefits based upon the worker’s failure to follow proper procedures. Maguire v. Dominion Dev. Corp., 241 Ga. App. 715, 527 S.E.2d 575 (1999). General contractor was considered a statutory employer under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-8(a) and therefore immune from liability in a subcontractor’s action against it seeking recovery of personal injuries sustained in a work accident; accordingly, summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 was properly granted to the contractor. Reynolds v. McKenzie-Perry Homes, Inc., 261 Ga. App. 379, 582 S.E.2d 534 (2003). In a personal injury action filed by a subcontractor’s employee against the general contractor, the trial court properly concluded that the general contractor was a principal contractor that hired the subcontractor to aid it in the completion of its contract to supply wood chips to a paper company; accordingly, the general contractor was a statutory employer entitled to tort immunity in the employee’s suit. Patterson v. Bristol Timber Co., 286 Ga. App. 423, 649 S.E.2d 795 (2007). Trial court erred in ruling that an employee’s tort claim against a general contractor was not barred by the exclusive-remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11(a), because the general contractor was potentially liable to the employee for workers’ compensation benefits and, consequently, was immune from tort liability; pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-8(a), the general contractor was the employee’s statutory employer at the time of the accident because the employee was hired by a subcontractor and was working on the construction project site at the time that of the injury, and the subcontractor was hired by the general contractor to perform work as a subcontractor on the construction project. Vratsinas Constr. Co. v. Chitwood, 314 Ga. App. 357, 723 S.E.2d 740 (2012). Company as employer and contractor immune. — Regardless of fact that the decedent’s employer was an independent contractor and death occurred in performance of an independent contract, evidence established that the defendant was both a principal contractor and the decedent’s statutory employer under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-8. Thus, the defendant was entitled to tort immunity pursuant to O.C.G.A.