Title 19, Customs DutiesRelease 119-110
§1675a Special Rules for Section 1675(b) and 1675(c) Reviews
Title 19 › CHAPTER 4 — TARIFF ACT OF 1930 › SUBTITLE IV — COUNTERVAILING AND ANTIDUMPING DUTIES › Part III — Reviews; Other Actions Regarding Agreements › subpart a — review of amount of duty and agreements other than quantitative restriction agreements › § 1675a
Summary
The Commission must decide, in a review, whether ending an trade remedy order or stopping a paused investigation would likely let harmful imports start again within a reasonably foreseeable time. To do that, it looks at how many imports would come in, whether they would undercut U.S. prices, and how those imports would hurt the U.S. industry. The Commission also checks its earlier findings, whether the industry improved because of the order, whether the industry is still vulnerable, and in antidumping cases it looks at any duty-absorption findings. When judging import volume, the Commission considers things like extra foreign production capacity, existing or rising inventories, trade barriers in other countries, and whether foreign plants could switch to making the product. When judging impact, it looks at likely drops in output, sales, market share, profits, wages, jobs, investment, and product development. The Commission may add together imports from countries whose reviews started the same day if those imports compete with each other and U.S. products, but it will not combine them if they have no clear adverse effect. For regional industries, the Commission can study the original region, another qualifying region, or the whole United States. The agency that sets duties (the administering authority) must decide separately whether ending a countervailing duty order would likely let a countervailable subsidy return. It looks at the net subsidy found before and at any changes to the program that gave the subsidy. If there is good cause, it can also look at other subsidy programs or new allegations that could apply to the exporters under review. That agency must tell the Commission what net subsidy is likely if the order ends. For dumping reviews, the agency must decide whether ending an antidumping order would likely let dumping return by looking at prior dumping margins and import volumes before and after the order. It can consider other price, cost, or market facts if there is good cause and must tell the Commission the likely dumping margin. A zero or very small ("de minimis") subsidy or dumping margin alone does not automatically mean the agency must find no likelihood of recurrence.
Full Legal Text
Title 19, §1675a
Customs Duties, Source: USLM XML via OLRC
(a)Determination of likelihood of continuation or recurrence of material injury
(1)In general
In a review conducted under section 1675(b) or (c) of this title, the Commission shall determine whether revocation of an order, or termination of a suspended investigation, would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of material injury within a reasonably foreseeable time. The Commission shall consider the likely volume, price effect, and impact of imports of the subject merchandise on the industry if the order is revoked or the suspended investigation is terminated. The Commission shall take into account—
(A)its prior injury determinations, including the volume, price effect, and impact of imports of the subject merchandise on the industry before the order was issued or the suspension agreement was accepted,
(B)whether any improvement in the state of the industry is related to the order or the suspension agreement,
(C)whether the industry is vulnerable to material injury if the order is revoked or the suspension agreement is terminated, and
(D)in an antidumping proceeding under section 1675(c) of this title, the findings of the administering authority regarding duty absorption under section 1675(a)(4) of this title.
(2)Volume
In evaluating the likely volume of imports of the subject merchandise if the order is revoked or the suspended investigation is terminated, the Commission shall consider whether the likely volume of imports of the subject merchandise would be significant if the order is revoked or the suspended investigation is terminated, either in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in the United States. In so doing, the Commission shall consider all relevant economic factors, including—
(A)any likely increase in production capacity or existing unused production capacity in the exporting country,
(B)existing inventories of the subject merchandise, or likely increases in inventories,
(C)the existence of barriers to the importation of such merchandise into countries other than the United States, and
(D)the potential for product-shifting if production facilities in the foreign country, which can be used to produce the subject merchandise, are currently being used to produce other products.
(3)Price
In evaluating the likely price effects of imports of the subject merchandise if the order is revoked or the suspended investigation is terminated, the Commission shall consider whether—
(A)there is likely to be significant price underselling by imports of the subject merchandise as compared to domestic like products, and
(B)imports of the subject merchandise are likely to enter the United States at prices that otherwise would have a significant depressing or suppressing effect on the price of domestic like products.
(4)Impact on the industry
In evaluating the likely impact of imports of the subject merchandise on the industry if the order is revoked or the suspended investigation is terminated, the Commission shall consider all relevant economic factors which are likely to have a bearing on the state of the industry in the United States, including, but not limited to—
(A)likely declines in output, sales, market share, profits, productivity, return on investments, and utilization of capacity,
(B)likely negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital, and investment, and
(C)likely negative effects on the existing development and production efforts of the industry, including efforts to develop a derivative or more advanced version of the domestic like product.
The Commission shall evaluate all relevant economic factors described in this paragraph within the context of the business cycle and the conditions of competition that are distinctive to the affected industry.
(5)Basis for determination
The presence or absence of any factor which the Commission is required to consider under this subsection shall not necessarily give decisive guidance with respect to the Commission’s determination of whether material injury is likely to continue or recur within a reasonably foreseeable time if the order is revoked or the suspended investigation is terminated. In making that determination, the Commission shall consider that the effects of revocation or termination may not be imminent, but may manifest themselves only over a longer period of time.
(6)Magnitude of margin of dumping and net countervailable subsidy; nature of countervailable subsidy
In making a determination under section 1675(b) or (c) of this title, the Commission may consider the magnitude of the margin of dumping or the magnitude of the net countervailable subsidy. If a countervailable subsidy is involved the Commission shall consider information regarding the nature of the countervailable subsidy and whether the subsidy is a subsidy described in Article 3 or 6.1 of the Subsidies Agreement.
(7)Cumulation
For purposes of this subsection, the Commission may cumulatively assess the volume and effect of imports of the subject merchandise from all countries with respect to which reviews under section 1675(b) or (c) of this title were initiated on the same day, if such imports would be likely to compete with each other and with domestic like products in the United States market. The Commission shall not cumulatively assess the volume and effects of imports of the subject merchandise in a case in which it determines that such imports are likely to have no discernible adverse impact on the domestic industry.
(8)Special rule for regional industries
In a review under section 1675(b) or (c) of this title involving a regional industry, the Commission may base its determination on the regional industry defined in the original investigation under this subtitle, another region that satisfies the criteria established in section 1677(4)(C) of this title, or the United States as a whole. In determining if a regional industry analysis is appropriate for the determination in the review, the Commission shall consider whether the criteria established in section 1677(4)(C) of this title are likely to be satisfied if the order is revoked or the suspended investigation is terminated.
(b)Determination of likelihood of continuation or recurrence of a countervailable subsidy
(1)In general
In a review conducted under section 1675(c) of this title, the administering authority shall determine whether revocation of a countervailing duty order or termination of a suspended investigation under section 1671c of this title would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of a countervailable subsidy. The administering authority shall consider—
(A)the net countervailable subsidy determined in the investigation and subsequent reviews, and
(B)whether any change in the program which gave rise to the net countervailable subsidy described in subparagraph (A) has occurred that is likely to affect that net countervailable subsidy.
(2)Consideration of other factors
If good cause is shown, the administering authority shall also consider—
(A)programs determined to provide countervailable subsidies in other investigations or reviews under this subtitle, but only to the extent that such programs—
(i)can potentially be used by the exporters or producers subject to the review under section 1675(c) of this title, and
(ii)did not exist at the time that the countervailing duty order was issued or the suspension agreement was accepted, and
(B)programs newly alleged to provide countervailable subsidies but only to the extent that the administering authority makes an affirmative countervailing duty determination with respect to such programs and with respect to the exporters or producers subject to the review.
(3)Net countervailable subsidy
The administering authority shall provide to the Commission the net countervailable subsidy that is likely to prevail if the order is revoked or the suspended investigation is terminated. The administering authority shall normally choose a net countervailable subsidy that was determined under section 1671d of this title or subsection (a) or (b)(1) of section 1675 of this title.
(4)Special rule
(A)Treatment of zero and de minimis rates
A net countervailable subsidy described in paragraph (1)(A) that is zero or de minimis shall not by itself require the administering authority to determine that revocation of a countervailing duty order or termination of a suspended investigation would not be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of a countervailable subsidy.
(B)Application of de minimis standards
For purposes of this paragraph, the administering authority shall apply the de minimis standards applicable to reviews conducted under subsections (a) and (b)(1) of section 1675 of this title.
(c)Determination of likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping
(1)In general
In a review conducted under section 1675(c) of this title, the administering authority shall determine whether revocation of an antidumping duty order or termination of a suspended investigation under section 1673c of this title would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of sales of the subject merchandise at less than fair value. The administering authority shall consider—
(A)the weighted average dumping margins determined in the investigation and subsequent reviews, and
(B)the volume of imports of the subject merchandise for the period before and the period after the issuance of the antidumping duty order or acceptance of the suspension agreement.
(2)Consideration of other factors
If good cause is shown, the administering authority shall also consider such other price, cost, market, or economic factors as it deems relevant.
(3)Magnitude of the margin of dumping
The administering authority shall provide to the Commission the magnitude of the margin of dumping that is likely to prevail if the order is revoked or the suspended investigation is terminated. The administering authority shall normally choose a margin that was determined under section 1673d of this title or under subsection (a) or (b)(1) of section 1675 of this title.
(4)Special rule
(A)Treatment of zero or de minimis margins
A dumping margin described in paragraph (1)(A) that is zero or de minimis shall not by itself require the administering authority to determine that revocation of an antidumping duty order or termination of a suspended investigation would not be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of sales at less than fair value.
(B)Application of de minimis standards
For purposes of this paragraph, the administering authority shall apply the de minimis standards applicable to reviews conducted under subsections (a) and (b) of section 1675 of this title.
Legislative History
Notes & Related Subsidiaries
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
Section effective, except as otherwise provided, on the date on which the WTO Agreement enters into force with respect to the United States (Jan. 1, 1995), and applicable with respect to investigations, reviews, and inquiries initiated and petitions filed under specified provisions of this chapter after such date, see section 291 of Pub. L. 103–465, set out as an
Effective Date
of 1994 Amendment note under section 1671 of this title.
Reference
Citations & Metadata
Citation
19 U.S.C. § 1675a
Title 19, Customs Duties
Last Updated
Sep 22, 2026
Release point: 119-110