Title 19 › Chapter 4— TARIFF ACT OF 1930 › Subtitle SUBTITLE IV— COUNTERVAILING AND ANTIDUMPING DUTIES › Part III— Reviews; Other Actions Regarding Agreements › Subpart a— review of amount of duty and agreements other than quantitative restriction agreements › § 1675a
When the government reviews whether to end an antidumping or countervailing duty order or to stop a suspended investigation, the Commission must decide if ending it would probably cause material harm to the U.S. industry within a reasonably foreseeable time. The Commission looks at three main things: how many imports would come in, how those imports would affect prices, and how imports would affect the industry. It also considers past findings, whether the industry’s recovery depends on the order, how vulnerable the industry is, and, in antidumping cases, any findings about duties being absorbed. To judge import volume the Commission considers things like foreign production capacity, inventories, trade barriers in other countries, and whether foreign plants could switch products. To judge price effects it checks for likely underselling and whether import prices would drive down U.S. prices. To judge impact it looks at likely drops in output, sales, market share, profits, investment, jobs, wages, and development of new products. No single factor decides the outcome, effects might appear slowly, and the Commission may consider the size of dumping margins or subsidies. The Commission can add together imports from countries with reviews started the same day if those imports compete, and in regional cases it can limit the analysis to a region defined earlier or look at the whole United States. The agency that enforces duties must decide, in countervailing duty reviews, whether ending the order would likely bring back a countervailable subsidy. It will use the net subsidy found before and any changes to the subsidy program. If there is good cause, it can also look at similar programs found in other cases or newly alleged programs if it makes an affirmative finding. That agency must tell the Commission the net subsidy that would likely apply, usually using a previously determined figure. A zero or de minimis subsidy or dumping margin alone does not automatically mean revocation is safe; the same de minimis rules used in reviews apply. In antidumping reviews the agency must decide whether ending the order would likely lead to continued sales at less than fair value, using past weighted-average margins and import volumes before and after the order, and it must report the likely margin to the Commission.
Full Legal Text
Customs Duties — Source: USLM XML via OLRC
Legislative History
Reference
Citation
19 U.S.C. § 1675a
Title 19 — Customs Duties
Last Updated
Apr 5, 2026
Release point: 119-73not60