Nuclear Waste Policy Act — Spent Fuel Disposal & Yucca Mountain

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 10101–10270), enacted in 1982 and significantly amended in 1987, establishes the federal framework for permanent disposal of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel from commercial power plants and defense activities. The Act assigns the Department of Energy (DOE) responsibility for developing a deep geologic repository — a permanent underground storage facility — and created the Nuclear Waste Fund (financed by a fee of 1 mill per kilowatt-hour on nuclear-generated electricity, which raised over $46 billion before fee collection was suspended in 2014). The 1987 amendments directed DOE to study only Yucca Mountain, Nevada as the repository site — making it the most studied piece of real estate in geological history. Despite over $15 billion spent on site characterization and licensing, Yucca Mountain has never opened: Nevada's fierce political opposition led the Obama administration to withdraw the NRC license application in 2010, and the repository remains in legal and political limbo. Meanwhile, approximately 86,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel sit in temporary storage at 72 reactor sites and 5 DOE facilities across 35 states — the most significant unresolved waste management problem in the U.S. energy system.

Current Law (2026)

Legal Authority

• 42 U.S.C. § 10131 — Findings and purposes (Congress finds that federal government has responsibility for permanent disposal of high-level radioactive waste; establishes framework for geologic repository development)
• 42 U.S.C. § 10134 — Site approval and construction authorization (after site characterization, DOE recommends repository site to President; President recommends to Congress; state or tribe may submit notice of disapproval — overridable by joint resolution of Congress)
• 42 U.S.C. § 10135 — Review of repository site selection (state/tribal veto process — host state may disapprove the site within 60 days; Congress may override by passing a resolution of approval in both chambers within 90 days)
• 42 U.S.C. § 10172 — Selection of Yucca Mountain site (the 1987 amendment directing DOE to study and characterize only Yucca Mountain as the candidate repository site — often called the "Screw Nevada Bill" by Nevadans)
• 42 U.S.C. § 10222 — Nuclear Waste Fund (establishes a trust fund financed by fees on nuclear-generated electricity; DOE shall use the Fund for repository development, interim storage, and related costs)

Implementing Regulations

The NRC's geologic repository licensing standards live at 10 CFR Part 60 — Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Wastes in Geologic Repositories (69 sections across 9 subparts). Part 60 prescribes the licensing standards the NRC would apply to the DOE's application to construct and operate a deep geologic repository — and constitutes the NRC's regulatory definition of what a "safe" repository means:

• § 60.101 — Purpose and nature of findings: a license to construct a geologic repository can be issued only if the NRC finds that the geologic setting and engineered barriers together provide reasonable assurance of compliance with the performance objectives; the findings must be based on the performance of the entire system over its regulatory timeframe (not just one barrier in isolation)
• § 60.111 — Performance through permanent closure: during the operating phase (before permanent closure), the repository operations area must limit radiation doses to any individual to 25 mrem/year; must limit airborne radioactivity releases to less than 10 CFR Part 20 limits; and must prevent criticality (uncontrolled nuclear chain reactions)
• § 60.112 — Overall system performance objective after permanent closure: the most significant provision — the total system must be capable of limiting the dose to the reasonably maximally exposed individual to no more than 25 rem/year for 10,000 years after permanent closure; this single objective captures the entire repository design requirement
• § 60.113 — Performance of particular barriers after closure: the engineered barrier system (waste package, buffer materials, borehole seals) must limit the cumulative release of any radionuclide to groundwater to no more than 1 part in 100,000 per year of the inventory present 1,000 years after permanent closure; the geologic setting must exhibit groundwater travel time from the disturbed zone to the accessible environment of at least 1,000 years
• § 60.121 — Land ownership requirements: both the geologic repository operations area and the postclosure controlled area must be located on land owned by the United States; states or tribes may not require permits or approvals that would conflict with NRC licensing authority
• § 60.122 — Siting criteria: an extensive list of 15+ favorable and potentially adverse conditions that must be evaluated for any candidate repository site, covering: (1) groundwater travel time and chemistry; (2) absence of economically extractable resources (ore, oil, gas) that could incentivize human intrusion; (3) seismic and volcanic stability; (4) low natural groundwater recharge rates; (5) absence of migratory pathways to surface water; (6) low population density within specified distances; and (7) absence of natural processes that could disrupt the repository over the regulatory timeframe

The Part 60 standards were first finalized in 1983 (48 FR 28222) and last substantially amended in 1996. They were designed with the expectation that they would apply to Yucca Mountain. However, when the NRC concluded that Yucca Mountain would be governed instead by a site-specific standard developed by EPA (10 CFR Part 63 and 40 CFR Part 197), Part 60 was effectively relegated to backup status. Part 60 would apply to any future repository at a site other than Yucca Mountain — an important consideration as Congress debates whether to pursue alternatives to Yucca Mountain for the first time since the 1987 amendment.

How It Works

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act is built around one concept: permanently isolating highly radioactive waste by burying it 1,000+ feet underground in a geologically stable formation where it will remain safely contained for 10,000 to 1 million years. The repository would receive waste in sealed canisters, emplace them in tunnels carved into host rock, and eventually seal the facility. The geological formation becomes the primary containment barrier after engineered barriers degrade over millennia. The 1982 Act directed DOE to evaluate multiple candidate sites; the 1987 amendment eliminated all candidates except Yucca Mountain — a ridge in the Nevada desert 100 miles northwest of Las Vegas on federal land. DOE spent over $15 billion characterizing the site, filed a license application with NRC in 2008, and had the application withdrawn in 2010 under political pressure. In 2013, a federal appeals court ruled NRC must resume its licensing review; NRC's Safety Evaluation Report found no disqualifying safety issues — but Congress has not funded further work and the repository remains in indefinite limbo.

Since 1983, nuclear utilities paid into the Nuclear Waste Fund at $0.001/kWh on nuclear-generated electricity. Over $46 billion was collected before a federal court ordered fee collection suspended in 2014, ruling DOE could not continue collecting fees without a viable repository program. About $2.6 billion remains; the rest was spent on site characterization, transferred to the Treasury, or absorbed by program costs. Meanwhile, DOE was contractually obligated to begin accepting spent fuel by January 31, 1998 — it didn't, and still hasn't. Utilities have sued for breach of contract, and the federal government has paid over $10 billion in judgments and settlements, with ongoing liability growing at $500+ million per year. Spent fuel sits in water-filled pools inside reactor buildings and in steel-and-concrete dry cask containers at 70+ reactor sites nationwide. Private companies have pursued NRC licenses for consolidated interim storage facilities in Texas and New Mexico as alternatives, but face significant political and legal opposition from host states.

How It Affects You

State Variations

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act is exclusively federal, but state roles are significant:

Implementing Regulations

• 10 CFR Part 960 — DOE general guidelines for recommending nuclear waste repository sites (site selection criteria, environmental assessments, disqualifying conditions for candidate sites)

• 10 CFR Part 63 — NRC Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Wastes in a Geologic Repository at Yucca Mountain (79 sections — the comprehensive NRC licensing regulation for the proposed Yucca Mountain repository, setting the performance standards, application content, and safety criteria that DOE's license application must satisfy before NRC can authorize construction and operation). Key subparts:

  • Subpart A — General Provisions: § 63.1 authorizes NRC to license DOE to "receive and possess" high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel at a geologic repository operations area at the Yucca Mountain site; § 63.21 specifies the content of DOE's license application — a Safety Analysis Report, an environmental impact statement required by NWPA and NEPA, site characterization documentation, and a quality assurance program description; § 63.15 requires DOE to conduct and document site characterization investigations before submitting an application
  • Subpart B — Preclosure Safety Standards: § 63.111 — performance objectives during repository construction and operation through permanent closure — radiation dose to workers and the public must meet 10 CFR Part 20 dose limits; releases of radioactive material must not exceed EPA's standards at 40 CFR Part 197; § 63.112 requires a preclosure safety analysis identifying all structures, systems, and components important to safety
  • Subpart E — Postclosure Performance Objectives: § 63.113(a) — the repository must include multiple barriers (both engineered barriers and natural geologic barriers); § 63.113(b) — mean annual dose to any individual member of the public may not exceed 0.15 mSv/year (15 mrem/year) for the first 10,000 years after closure; § 63.114 — performance assessment must account for uncertainty, incorporate data on geology, hydrology, geochemistry, and disruptive events (seismic, volcanic intrusion), and assess performance over the regulatory period; § 63.115 — the application must identify the specific features of the engineered and natural barrier systems that qualify as "important barriers"
  • Subpart F — Performance Confirmation: §§ 63.131–63.134 — during construction and operation, DOE must conduct a continuing performance confirmation program; geotechnical monitoring, design testing of engineered systems (borehole seals, drip shields, backfill), and waste package monitoring must continue until permanent closure; if monitoring reveals that actual conditions differ materially from design assumptions, modifications may be required before the repository is sealed
  • Subpart G — Quality Assurance: § 63.142 — QA criteria incorporate 18 NRC standard criteria covering design control, procurement, inspection, nonconforming materials, and corrective action; DOE must implement a documented QA program covering all structures, systems, and components important to safety; § 63.144 allows DOE to change the QA program description without NRC pre-approval if the changes are clearly within the bounds of the accepted description
  • Subpart K — Preclosure Radiation Standards: § 63.204 — no member of the public in the general environment may receive more than 0.15 mSv (15 mrem/year) from operations at the Yucca Mountain site during preclosure; the postclosure standard incorporates EPA's long-term performance standards from 40 CFR Part 197 (covering 10,000 years and, for peak dose, up to 1 million years after closure)

  NRC's Yucca Mountain regulations establish a layered performance standard: NRC sets the licensing requirements (10 CFR Part 63); EPA sets the ambient radiation protection standards the repository must achieve (40 CFR Part 197); DOE designs the repository and submits the license application. The Obama administration's 2010 withdrawal of DOE's license application put Part 63's licensing machinery in indefinite suspension; the Trump administration's 2025 direction to resume the Yucca Mountain licensing proceeding has returned Part 63's performance standards to active regulatory relevance for the first time in 15 years.

• 10 CFR Part 961 — DOE Standard Contract for Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and/or High-Level Radioactive Waste: the regulatory framework establishing the form and terms of the contractual relationship between DOE and commercial nuclear power plant operators (and other civilian SNF/HLW generators) for ultimate waste disposal. Part 961 implements NWPA § 302, which required DOE to offer the Standard Contract to all utilities and required utilities to execute it by a specified deadline to secure their place in the disposal queue. Key provisions:

  • § 961.1 — Purpose: establishes the contractual terms under which DOE will make nuclear waste disposal services available; the Standard Contract is the implementing mechanism for the Nuclear Waste Fund fee and the disposal obligation Congress imposed on DOE; without an executed Standard Contract, a utility's SNF has no path to the federal repository
  • § 961.2 — Applicability: applies to any person owning or generating SNF or HLW from a civilian nuclear power reactor; the Standard Contract was offered to all utilities prior to the 1983 deadline; utilities that executed the contract in a timely manner secured DOE's contractual obligation to begin disposal services; federal agencies with SNF/HLW needs use interagency agreements (§961.5) rather than the Standard Contract
  • § 961.3 — Definitions: "Generator" means any person who owns or generates SNF or HLW; "Acceptance Schedule" means DOE's delivery schedule for taking title to SNF from utilities; "Nuclear Waste Fund" means the fund established by NWPA to finance DOE's disposal program through the 1 mill/kWh fee on nuclear-generated electricity
  • § 961.11 — Text of the Standard Contract: the Standard Contract contains the operative provisions that made this regulation historically significant: (1) utilities agreed to pay the 1 mill/kWh fee into the Nuclear Waste Fund for every kilowatt-hour of nuclear generation; (2) DOE committed to begin accepting SNF by January 31, 1998 and to dispose of it in the federal repository; (3) DOE retained the right to schedule acceptance of spent fuel and set priority among utilities; (4) utilities retained title to their spent fuel until DOE accepted delivery

  The Standard Contract became the centerpiece of the largest breach-of-contract dispute in U.S. government history. DOE missed the January 31, 1998 acceptance deadline — Yucca Mountain was not ready, and no alternative repository existed. Nuclear utilities filed suit, and courts ruled that DOE had breached the Standard Contract. By 2026, DOE has paid more than $9 billion in damages to utilities for the ongoing breach; the liability continues to accumulate at approximately $500 million per year. Congress suspended collection of the 1 mill/kWh fee in 2014 (after courts found it unlawful to collect fees when DOE had no viable disposal plan), and the Nuclear Waste Fund holds approximately $46 billion — enough to finance a repository, but unavailable without a congressional appropriation. The Trump administration's 2025 direction to revive Yucca Mountain licensing reignited the question of whether the Standard Contract's delivery obligations can be met before utilities incur further breach damages.

• 10 CFR Part 835 — Occupational Radiation Protection (DOE standards for radiation worker protection at DOE facilities including waste processing sites: dose limits, monitoring, training, contamination control; 44 sections)

• 10 CFR Part 963 — Yucca Mountain Site Suitability Guidelines: DOE's own criteria for determining whether the Yucca Mountain site is suitable to be recommended to the President as a nuclear waste repository — separate from NRC's licensing standards in 10 CFR Part 63, these are the DOE criteria DOE must apply before it even submits a license application:

  • § 963.11 — Suitability determination structure: DOE must evaluate suitability for both the preclosure period (construction and operation of the repository, before permanent closure) and the postclosure period (the 10,000+ year period after the repository is permanently sealed); if either evaluation results in a finding of unsuitability, DOE must disqualify Yucca Mountain as a candidate site — the two-part evaluation ensures both short-term operational safety and long-term waste isolation are addressed
  • § 963.12–963.14 — Preclosure suitability: DOE evaluates whether the Yucca Mountain site can be constructed and operated safely — whether the facility can contain radioactive material, limit releases, implement emergency systems, meet radiation exposure limits, and be decommissioned; preclosure evaluation focuses on design feasibility and operational safety using standard nuclear safety engineering criteria; a site is unsuitable if the preclosure safety evaluation shows that there is no reasonable basis for concluding the site can meet applicable radiation dose limits
  • § 963.15–963.17 — Postclosure suitability and total system performance assessment: postclosure evaluation uses a Total System Performance Assessment (TSPA) — a comprehensive probabilistic analysis of all processes (geologic, hydrological, geochemical, thermal, seismic) that could affect the repository's ability to contain radiation over 10,000 years; the TSPA models how water infiltration, rock chemistry, engineered barrier corrosion, and heat from radioactive decay interact over millennia; a site is postclosure unsuitable if the TSPA shows that mean annual dose to individuals in the vicinity would exceed 15 mrem/year (0.15 mSv/year) for the period 10,000 years after closure, or if the uncertainty in the performance assessment is so large that a finding of suitability cannot be made with reasonable confidence
  • § 963.2 — Definitions: the regulation adopts the applicable radiation protection standards from 10 CFR 63.111 (preclosure dose limits) and 10 CFR 63.113 (postclosure dose limits), and defines "total system performance assessment" as the probabilistic methodology used to integrate all relevant processes into a single performance estimate over the regulatory time period

  Part 963 represents DOE's self-evaluation framework — the criteria DOE applies before recommending Yucca Mountain to the President. DOE completed its site suitability evaluation under Part 963 and recommended Yucca Mountain to President Bush in February 2002; Congress overrode Nevada's veto of the selection. DOE submitted its NRC license application in 2008. The Obama administration's 2010 withdrawal of the license application did not formally re-open the Part 963 evaluation — it simply stopped the NRC proceeding. The Trump administration's 2025 direction to resume Yucca Mountain licensing returns Part 963's suitability framework to relevance, though DOE has not formally reopened the site suitability determination.

Pending Legislation

Nuclear waste disposal reform provisions appear in broader energy legislation. See Nuclear Energy Regulation and Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Recent Developments

The Yucca Mountain stalemate continues — the site remains legally designated but unfunded. Private consolidated interim storage proposals in Texas (Waste Control Specialists/Interim Storage Partners) and New Mexico (Holtec International) have advanced through NRC licensing but face opposition from state governments, tribal nations, and environmental groups. DOE has initiated a "consent-based siting" process for nuclear waste storage — seeking communities willing to voluntarily host waste facilities, a departure from the top-down approach that designated Yucca Mountain. The growth of advanced nuclear technology (small modular reactors, Generation IV designs) has renewed urgency for a waste solution — without a path forward on disposal, new nuclear builds face opposition based on the unresolved waste problem. The Nuclear Waste Fund balance continues to earn interest, but no new fees are being collected.

• Trump revives Yucca Mountain (2025): The Trump administration signaled renewed interest in resuming the Yucca Mountain license review — which the Obama administration had shut down in 2010 by withdrawing DOE's license application. The NRC's Atomic Safety and Licensing Board had continued preliminary proceedings; the Trump DOE directed NRC to resume the licensing proceeding. Nevada's congressional delegation and Governor have maintained fierce opposition, and Congress has not appropriated funds specifically for Yucca Mountain resumption. The renewed attention has brought Yucca Mountain back into the nuclear policy conversation, but the political and legal obstacles remain substantial.
• Private interim storage licensing — Holtec and ISP decisions: The NRC issued its final supplemental environmental impact statement for the Holtec International consolidated interim storage facility in New Mexico in 2024, completing the environmental review. NRC also advanced the Interim Storage Partners (WCS) license in Texas. Both facilities face state-level legal challenges — New Mexico and Texas enacted legislation attempting to block the facilities on state public safety grounds. Federal preemption under the Atomic Energy Act should give NRC authority prevailing over state objections, but litigation is ongoing. If licensed and operational, these facilities would accept spent fuel from shutdown reactors, providing a pathway out of the current at-reactor storage situation.
• Advanced reactor waste implications: The nuclear renaissance — small modular reactors (SMRs), molten salt reactors, and other advanced designs — produces different waste profiles than light water reactors. Some advanced reactors can use spent nuclear fuel as input, potentially reducing the waste inventory. Others (particularly fast-spectrum reactors) transmute long-lived isotopes into shorter-lived ones. The NRC and DOE have been developing waste classification frameworks for advanced reactor waste; the Nuclear Waste Policy Act's framework (designed for light water reactor spent fuel) does not map cleanly onto advanced reactor waste types. Legislation to update the NWPA for advanced reactors has been proposed but not enacted.
• OBBBA nuclear energy provisions: The One Big Beautiful Bill Act included provisions accelerating nuclear energy deployment — streamlining NRC licensing, directing DOE to restart reactor license applications at former nuclear sites, and providing tax incentives for new nuclear construction. The OBBBA's nuclear provisions did not resolve the waste disposal question, but they increased the urgency: more nuclear generation means more spent fuel accumulation, making the absence of a permanent disposal solution more acute. The nuclear industry's support for the OBBBA's energy provisions was conditioned in part on renewed federal commitment to waste disposal progress.