Producer
Urenco Group
Anglo-German-Dutch uranium enrichment consortium with operations in UK, Netherlands, Germany, and USA (Urenco USA at Eunice NM — the sole US enrichment facility). Key Western alternative to Russian enrichment for US nuclear fuel.
4
Inputs supplied
2
Goods downstream
3
Facilities
0
Stories
What they make
4 inputs Urenco Group supplies
Click an input to see every good that depends on it, every country that produces it, and every other company in the supply chain.
mineral
Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) Nuclear Fuel →
mineral
Sole supplierLow-Enriched Uranium (LEU) Nuclear Fuel →
mineral
Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) Nuclear Fuel →
mineral
Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) Nuclear Fuel →
Where it shows up
Goods downstream
Essential goods that depend on something Urenco Group makes — pick one to see the full supply chain.
Where they make it
3 facilities
Urenco Almelo Enrichment Plant (Netherlands) →
NLOverijssel · processing
Urenco's primary enrichment facility at Almelo, Overijssel, Netherlands. Capacity ~5,000 tSW/year (tonnes of Separative Work per year). Urenco Netherlands is owned equally by Urenco Group (UK-NL-DE JV). As of 2025, Urenco announced plans to double expansion at Almelo — adding ~1.5M additional SWU capacity in two stages (Stage 1 operational from 2027, Stage 2 from 2030). This expansion is driven by Western utility demand for non-Russian enrichment following the US Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act (May 2024) and similar European diversification mandates. Almelo is the original Urenco centrifuge technology development site (URENCO Group founded here in 1970 from the UK-NL-DE Treaty of Almelo).
Urenco Capenhurst Enrichment Plant (Cheshire, UK) →
GBCheshire · processing
Urenco UK enrichment facility at Capenhurst, Cheshire, UK. Capacity ~4,500 tSW/year. Capenhurst is also the site of a planned HALEU (High Assay Low-Enriched Uranium) facility targeting 10 tonnes HALEU/year by 2031 — the first dedicated HALEU enrichment facility in Europe. HALEU (uranium enriched to 5–19.75% U-235) is required for next-generation nuclear reactors (Kairos Power, TerraPower Natrium, X-energy). Capenhurst was historically a UK gas diffusion enrichment site before transitioning to centrifuge technology under Urenco.
Urenco USA National Enrichment Facility →
USNew Mexico · manufacturing
The ONLY uranium enrichment facility in the United States; ~5.7 million SWU/year capacity; produces ~10% of US LEU needs; located near Eunice NM; owned by Urenco (UK-DE-NL consortium)
What else they do
Business segments
The company's full revenue map — where this supply-chain role fits within their broader business.
Uranium Enrichment — Western Primary Provider
95%HALEU Development
3%Stable Isotopes (Minor)
2%
Intelligence
What's known
Sourced claims about this company's role in supply chains — chokepoints, concentration, incidents, dual-use connections.
Chokepoint2023
Urenco USA in Eunice, New Mexico is the only commercial uranium enrichment facility on US soil — but it is entirely owned by the British, German, and Dutch governments (via the Almelo Treaty, 1970). The United States has no American-owned commercial enrichment capacity. When the US Congress banned Russian enriched uranium imports in 2024 (cutting TENEX/Rosatom's 46% US market share), US utilities became entirely dependent on foreign-government-owned enrichment (Urenco) or French state-owned facilities (Orano).
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ↗Did you know2023
The sole uranium enrichment facility on US soil (Urenco USA, Eunice, New Mexico) is owned by the British, German, and Dutch governments — not by the United States. The US nuclear power industry's only domestic-soil enrichment asset is a foreign-sovereign-controlled facility operating under NRC license. This creates a structural sovereignty question with no parallel in other US energy infrastructure: if UK/German/Dutch governments chose to restrict Urenco USA's operations (for any political, contractual, or strategic reason), the US would have zero domestic uranium enrichment capacity whatsoever. The 2024 Russian LEU ban demonstrated how uranium enrichment supply chains can be disrupted by geopolitical decisions — the US's sole domestic fallback is itself subject to allied-foreign-government control.
Urenco Limited ↗Origin2023
Urenco's Almelo, Netherlands centrifuge facility was the unwitting origin of the most consequential nuclear weapons proliferation network in history. Abdul Qadeer Khan (A.Q. Khan), a Pakistani metallurgist, worked at Urenco Almelo in the 1970s where he stole centrifuge designs and supplier contact lists. Khan used this technology to build Pakistan's uranium enrichment program and subsequently sold the designs to North Korea, Libya, and Iran in exchange for cash and reciprocal technologies. The proliferation network Khan built from stolen Urenco designs contributed to four countries' nuclear weapons programs. The facility where this began is now the primary Western non-Russian uranium enrichment source — an institution whose theft history shaped the geopolitics of nuclear proliferation for 50 years.
Urenco Limited ↗Capacity2025
Urenco announced plans to double its capacity expansion at Almelo, Netherlands — adding approximately 1.5 million SWU of new enrichment capacity in two stages (Stage 1 operational from 2027, Stage 2 from 2030), on top of the existing 5,000 tSW/year at Almelo. Combined with ongoing expansions at Gronau (Germany) and Capenhurst (UK, HALEU focus), Urenco is executing the largest centrifuge enrichment expansion program in Western history, directly responding to the loss of Russian enrichment access for Western utilities. Urenco's 2024 financial results showed record revenue and contract backlog driven by long-term enrichment contracts signed by utilities seeking to replace Russian supply.
World Nuclear News ↗