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§6117 Annual Assessments and Reports to the President and Congress Regarding the Condition of the United States Nuclear Weapons Stockpile

Title 10 › Subtitle A — General Military Law › PART VI — ELEMENTS OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND OTHER MATTERS › Subpart B — Atomic Energy Defense › CHAPTER 602 — NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE MATTERS › SUBCHAPTER I — STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP AND WEAPONS PRODUCTION › § 6117

Last updated Sep 22, 2026|Official source

Summary

Each year, certain officials must check the condition of every type of U.S. nuclear weapon they are directly responsible for. The people who must do this are the head of each national security laboratory and the Commander of the United States Strategic Command. The Energy Department’s Administrator may set up “dual validation teams” made of experts from the other labs to do independent checks using surveillance, test data, calculations, and experiments. Each lab head must also set up “red teams” with experts from the other two labs to review and challenge the lab’s assessments and any dual validation work, and report their findings to the lab head. By December 1 each year, those officials must send a written report to the appropriate Secretary (the Secretary of Energy for Energy matters, the Secretary of Defense for Defense matters) and to the Nuclear Weapons Council. Reports must give assessment results, say whether any underground nuclear tests are needed or might be useful (naming specific tests and explaining why), and state readiness to carry out such tests if ordered. Lab reports must also briefly assess the science tools, manufacturing tools, red-team findings, dual-validation results, and major investigations. The Strategic Command report must note alternatives, list major assembly releases for active and inactive stockpiles, and give views on the stockpile responsiveness program. By February 1 the two Secretaries must send those reports and their comments to the President, who must send them to Congress by March 15. If the President does not, the officials must brief the congressional defense committees by March 30. All submissions must be classified and marked at the proper level.

Title 10, §6117

Armed Forces, Source: USLM XML via OLRC

(a)Annual Assessments Required.—

For each nuclear weapon type in the stockpile of the United States, each official specified in subsection (b) on an annual basis shall, to the extent such official is directly responsible for the safety, reliability, performance, or military effectiveness of that nuclear weapon type, complete an assessment of the safety, reliability, performance, or military effectiveness (as the case may be) of that nuclear weapon type.

(b)Covered Officials.—

The officials referred to in subsection (a) are the following:

(1)The head of each national security laboratory.

(2)The Commander of the United States Strategic Command.

(c)Dual Validation Teams in Support of Assessments.—

In support of the assessments required by subsection (a), the Administrator may establish teams, known as “dual validation teams”, to provide each national security laboratory responsible for weapons design with independent evaluations of the condition of each warhead for which such laboratory has lead responsibility. A dual validation team established by the Administrator shall—

(1)be comprised of weapons experts from the laboratory that does not have lead responsibility for fielding the warhead being evaluated;

(2)have access to all surveillance and underground test data for all stockpile systems for use in the independent evaluations;

(3)use all relevant available data to conduct independent calculations; and

(4)pursue independent experiments to support the independent evaluations.

(d)Use of Teams of Experts for Assessments.—

The head of each national security laboratory shall establish and use one or more teams of experts, known as “red teams”, to assist in the assessments required by subsection (a). Each such team shall include experts from both of the other national security laboratories. Each such team for a national security laboratory shall—

(1)review both the matters covered by the assessments under subsection (a) performed by the head of that laboratory and any independent evaluations conducted by a dual validation team under subsection (c);

(2)subject such matters to challenge; and

(3)submit the results of such review and challenge, together with the findings and recommendations of such team with respect to such review and challenge, to the head of that laboratory.

(e)Report on Assessments.—

Not later than December 1 of each year, each official specified in subsection (b) shall submit to the Secretary concerned, and to the Nuclear Weapons Council, a report on the assessments that such official was required by subsection (a) to complete. The report shall include the following:

(1)The results of each such assessment.

(2)(A)Such official’s determination as to whether or not one or more underground nuclear tests are necessary to resolve any issues identified in the assessments and, if so—

(i)an identification of the specific underground nuclear tests that are necessary to resolve such issues; and

(ii)a discussion of why options other than an underground nuclear test are not available or would not resolve such issues.

(B)An identification of the specific underground nuclear tests which, while not necessary, might have value in resolving any such issues and a discussion of the anticipated value of conducting such tests.

(C)Such official’s determination as to the readiness of the United States to conduct the underground nuclear tests identified under subparagraphs (A)(i) and (B), if directed by the President to do so.

(3)In the case of a report submitted by the head of a national security laboratory—

(A)a concise statement regarding the adequacy of the science-based tools and methods, including with respect to cyber assurance, being used to determine the matters covered by the assessments;

(B)a concise statement regarding the adequacy of the tools and methods employed by the manufacturing infrastructure required by section 6122 to identify and fix any inadequacy with respect to the matters covered by the assessments, and the confidence of the head in such tools and methods;

(C)a concise summary of the findings and recommendations of any teams under subsection (d) that relate to the assessments, together with a discussion of those findings and recommendations;

(D)a concise summary of the results of any independent evaluation conducted by a dual validation team under subsection (c); and

(E)a concise summary of any significant finding investigations initiated or active during the previous year for which the head of the national security laboratory has full or partial responsibility.

(4)In the case of a report submitted by the Commander of the United States Strategic Command—

(A)a discussion of the relative merits of other nuclear weapon types (if any), or compensatory measures (if any) that could be taken, that could enable accomplishment of the missions of the nuclear weapon types to which the assessments relate, should such assessments identify any deficiency with respect to such nuclear weapon types;

(B)a summary of all major assembly releases in place as of the date of the report for the active and inactive nuclear weapon stockpiles; and

(C)the views of the Commander on the stockpile responsiveness program under section 6131, the activities conducted under such program, and any suggestions to improve such program.

(5)An identification and discussion of any matter having an adverse effect on the capability of the official submitting the report to accurately determine the matters covered by the assessments.

(f)Submittals to the President and Congress.—

(1)Not later than February 1 of each year, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy shall submit to the President—

(A)each report, without change, submitted to either Secretary under subsection (e) during the preceding year;

(B)any comments that the Secretaries individually or jointly consider appropriate with respect to each such report;

(C)the conclusions that the Secretaries individually or jointly reach as to the safety, reliability, performance, and military effectiveness of the nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States; and

(D)any other information that the Secretaries individually or jointly consider appropriate.

(2)Not later than March 15 of each year, the President shall forward to Congress the matters received by the President under paragraph (1) for that year, together with any comments the President considers appropriate.

(3)If the President does not forward to Congress the matters required under paragraph (2) by the date required by such paragraph, the officials specified in subsection (b) shall provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees not later than March 30 on the report such officials submitted to the Secretary concerned under subsection (e).

(g)Classified Form.—

Each submittal under subsection (f) shall be in classified form only, with the classification level required for each portion of such submittal marked appropriately.

(h)Definition.—

In this section, the term “Secretary concerned” means—

(1)the Secretary of Energy, with respect to matters concerning the Department of Energy; and

(2)the Secretary of Defense, with respect to matters concerning the Department of Defense.

Editorial Notes

Prior Provisions

Provisions similar to those in this section were contained in section 2525 of Title 50, War and National Defense, prior to repeal by Pub. L. 119–60, § 3111(b)(1).

Amendments

2025—Pub. L. 119–60, § 3111(d)(2)(B), realigned margins.