Disruptionsanction · September 19, 2026

Karas Ukrainoje. Trumpas pasirašė įstatymą dėl sankcijų Rusijai

The headline indicates new sanctions on Russia, which can restrict trade in Russian goods and industrial inputs.

The trace

How it reaches your house.

Starting from Alrosa PJSC, we walked the supply graph hop by hop to the goods you buy and the companies you own. Each step is the engine’s reasoning, scored for confidence and cited where a source backs it.

First impact
TENEX (JSC Techsnabexport) →Shortage risk
Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) Nuclear Fuel
Russian sanctions can constrain TENEX exports, and this LEU supply has a 27% market share with low substitutability and a 24-month replacement lead time.
86% confidence
Alrosa PJSC →Shortage risk
Cut & Polished Diamonds
Sanctions on a Russian supplier like Alrosa would likely constrain this 30% share input, and the 24-month replacement lead time limits how quickly the supply gap can be filled.
71% confidence
Rosneft →Shortage risk
Crude Oil Feedstock
If sanctions disrupt Rosneft's energy operations, this crude oil feedstock stream would tighten modestly given its 4% market share and only moderate substitutability.
Hop 2
Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) Nuclear Fuel →Shortage risk
Russia
Russia supplies 44% of LEU on this graph, so sanctions on Russian trade should sharply reduce that supply share.
97% confidence
Crude Oil Feedstock →Shortage risk
Gasoline and diesel
Crude oil feedstock is a critical, fully dependent input for gasoline and diesel, so sanctions that tighten Russian crude supply directly reduce refined fuel availability.
96% confidence
Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) Nuclear Fuel →Shortage risk
TENEX (JSC Techsnabexport)
TENEX is the Russian supplier with a 27% LEU share, so sanctions on Russia should constrain its LEU exports and availability.
Hop 3
Russia →Shortage risk
PGM Sulfide Ore — Russian Arctic (Norilsk/Taimyr)
Russia is the sole source of this ore, so sanctions can directly remove the supply.
99% confidence
Saudi Arabia →supply up
Amine Desulfurization Chemicals
Saudi Arabia supplies 39.3% of this input, so sanctions that divert oil and gas processing demand away from Russia can make Saudi output materially more available.
82% confidence
Saudi Arabia →supply up
Marine Diesel and Bunker Fuel

Where it lands

What you buy, and what you own.

Goods you buy

Gasoline and diesel · Home heating oil · Jewelry · Cement and concrete · Diagnostic tests and lab supplies

Companies you may own

TENEX (JSC Techsnabexport)Urenco GroupKAP.LOrano SACCJCambridge Isotope Laboratories (CIL)MRK

Tap a company to see what it told the SEC could break it.

In the MyPRIA app, this is checked against your own holdings.

How it reaches your house.

First impact

TENEX (JSC Techsnabexport) →Shortage risk

Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) Nuclear Fuel

Russian sanctions can constrain TENEX exports, and this LEU supply has a 27% market share with low substitutability and a 24-month replacement lead time.

86% confidence

Alrosa PJSC →Shortage risk

Cut & Polished Diamonds

Sanctions on a Russian supplier like Alrosa would likely constrain this 30% share input, and the 24-month replacement lead time limits how quickly the supply gap can be filled.

71% confidence

Rosneft →Shortage risk

Crude Oil Feedstock

If sanctions disrupt Rosneft's energy operations, this crude oil feedstock stream would tighten modestly given its 4% market share and only moderate substitutability.

Hop 2

Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) Nuclear Fuel →Shortage risk

Russia

Russia supplies 44% of LEU on this graph, so sanctions on Russian trade should sharply reduce that supply share.

97% confidence

Crude Oil Feedstock →Shortage risk

Gasoline and diesel

Crude oil feedstock is a critical, fully dependent input for gasoline and diesel, so sanctions that tighten Russian crude supply directly reduce refined fuel availability.

96% confidence

Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) Nuclear Fuel →Shortage risk

TENEX (JSC Techsnabexport)

TENEX is the Russian supplier with a 27% LEU share, so sanctions on Russia should constrain its LEU exports and availability.

Hop 3

Russia →Shortage risk

PGM Sulfide Ore — Russian Arctic (Norilsk/Taimyr)

Russia is the sole source of this ore, so sanctions can directly remove the supply.

99% confidence

Saudi Arabia →supply up

Amine Desulfurization Chemicals

Saudi Arabia supplies 39.3% of this input, so sanctions that divert oil and gas processing demand away from Russia can make Saudi output materially more available.

82% confidence