Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) Nuclear Fuel →Shortage risk
Russia
Russia's 44% share of LEU supply makes it the dominant source, so sanctions can materially curtail Russian LEU availability.
97% confidence
Natural Gas (Haber-Bosch Feedstock and Fuel) →Shortage risk
Ammonia and nitrogen fertilizers
This is the direct Haber-Bosch downstream product, and the edge marks the dependency as critical (0.95), so sanctions-driven natural-gas tightness makes fertilizer supply scarcer.
96% confidence
Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) Nuclear Fuel →Shortage risk
TENEX (JSC Techsnabexport)
TENEX is a major LEU supplier with a 27% share, and tighter Russia sanctions can directly constrain its ability to export LEU.
95% confidence
Natural Gas (Roasting Fuel) →Shortage risk
Russia
Russia supplies 16% of this natural-gas stream, and the sanctions package directly targets Russian energy trade, constraining exports.
94% confidence
Natural Gas (Roasting Fuel) →Shortage risk
Iran
Iran supplies 7% of this natural-gas stream, so broader sanctions on Iran are likely to further constrain its energy trade.
91% confidence
Natural Gas (Pipeline-Grade, >95% Methane) →Shortage risk
Russia
Russia accounts for 16% of this gas supply, and sanctions on Russian energy trade would directly curtail its gas volumes and export access.
90% confidence
Natural Gas (Haber-Bosch Feedstock and Fuel) →Prices rise
Yara International ASAYAR
Natural gas is a major input with very low substitutability (0.15) and a 24-month replacement lead time, so a sanctions-driven gas squeeze raises Yara's input costs.
90% confidence
Helium (Grade 5.0 / Fiber-Drawing Grade) →Delays
Fiber optic cables and networking
Grade 5.0 helium is a critical fiber-drawing input, so sanctions-driven helium tightness can delay fiber optic cable production.
89% confidence
Cargill, Incorporated →Shortage risk
Black Sea Wheat (Russia & Ukraine Exports)
A broader U.S. sanctions package on Russia would further disrupt Black Sea wheat exports, and this input already accounts for 15% of Cargill's supply with only moderate substitutability.
88% confidence
Natural Gas (Pipeline-Grade, >95% Methane) →Prices rise
Electricity (residential)
Residential electricity is highly dependent on this gas input, so a sanctions-driven gas squeeze can raise power costs.
86% confidence
Natural Gas (Roasting Fuel) →Prices rise
Coffee
Coffee roasting is a critical downstream use of natural gas, so sanctions-driven gas tightness raises roasting-fuel costs.
86% confidence
Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) Nuclear Fuel →Prices rise
Residential Electricity
LEU is a critical nuclear-fuel input, so tighter supply should push up electricity costs for residential power consumers.
84% confidence
Bunge Limited →Shortage risk
Black Sea Wheat (Russia & Ukraine Exports)
A broader sanctions package that further restricts Russian trade would make Black Sea wheat harder to source and ship, and Bunge relies on this input for 18% of supply with a six-month replacement lead time.
83% confidence
Natural Gas (Haber-Bosch Feedstock and Fuel) →Prices rise
CF Industries HoldingsCF
This edge shows nontrivial exposure to natural gas with low substitutability (0.15) and a long 24-month replacement lead time, so gas tightness pushes CF's costs higher.
82% confidence
Natural Gas (Pipeline-Grade, >95% Methane) →Shortage risk
Iran
Iran's 7% supply share makes it a meaningful supplier, so sanctions tied to Iranian energy should tighten its gas trade and output.
82% confidence
Cut & Polished Diamonds →Shortage risk
Jewelry
Jewelry is a critical downstream user of cut & polished diamonds, so sanctions that tighten diamond trade propagate into a supply shortage for jewelry output.
76% confidence
Natural Gas (Haber-Bosch Feedstock and Fuel) →Prices rise
EuroChem Group
EuroChem has a direct natural-gas input exposure with low substitutability (0.2) and a 24-month replacement lead time, so constrained gas supply lifts its costs.
76% confidence
Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) Nuclear Fuel →Stands to benefit
KazatompromKAP.L
Kazatomprom's large LEU market share positions it to absorb some of the demand displaced from Russian supply.
66% confidence
Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) Nuclear Fuel →Stands to benefit
Urenco Group
As a non-Russian LEU supplier with a qualified-supplier position, Urenco can capture displaced demand when Russian supply is constrained.
64% confidence
Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) Nuclear Fuel →Stands to benefit
Orano SA
Orano can also pick up substitution demand as Russian LEU is restricted, with moderate benefit.
63% confidence
Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) Nuclear Fuel →Stands to benefit
CamecoCCJ
Cameco can benefit from substitution into non-Russian LEU supply, though its smaller share and longer replacement lead time temper the gain.
62% confidence
Natural Gas (Roasting Fuel) →Stands to benefit
United States
As a 25% supply-share alternative, U.S. gas can capture displaced demand when Russian and Iranian supply is restricted.
62% confidence
Bread, grains, and flour →Delays
Global Grain Trading & Shipping
Sanctions that restrict Russian and Iranian trade can delay and complicate the grain-trading and shipping step used to move Black Sea wheat into bread, grains, and flour.
61% confidence
Helium (Grade 5.0 / Fiber-Drawing Grade) →Stands to benefit
QatarEnergy LNG
As a large non-Russian helium supplier, QatarEnergy can absorb some demand displaced by sanctioned Russian and Iranian supply.
61% confidence
Natural Gas (Pipeline-Grade, >95% Methane) →Stands to benefit
United States
With the largest supply share in the graph, U.S. gas producers can capture demand displaced from Russia and Iran when their supply is constrained.
61% confidence
Ardent Mills →Prices rise
Durum Wheat / Semolina
If sanctions tighten Black Sea wheat supply, Ardent Mills can partially shift procurement toward durum wheat/semolina, creating substitution-driven demand pressure and higher prices over a multi-month adjustment period.
58% confidence
